This paper presents a two-country DSGE model with state-dependent pricing as in Dotsey, King, and Wolman (1999) in which firms price-discriminate across countries by setting prices in local currency. In this model, a domestic monetary expansion has greater spillover effects to foreign prices and foreign economic activity than an otherwise identical model with time-dependent pricing. In addition, the predictions of the state-dependent pricing model match the business-cycle moments better than the predictions of the time-dependent pricing model when driven by monetary policy shocks.
Introduction
What are the implications of monetary policy shocks when exchange rate passthrough to prices is sluggish and incomplete? To answer this question, the openeconomy macroeconomic literature has focused on dynamic general equilibrium models with nominal rigidities in which monopolistic …rms price-discriminate across countries by setting prices in local currency. This mechanism acts to limit the passthrough from exchange rate changes to foreign prices and largely insulates foreign economies from domestic monetary policy shocks. Good examples of these models include Betts and Devereux (2000) , Chari et al. (2002) , and Kollmann (2001) .
However, a much criticized but standard element of this literature is the exogenously imposed timing of the opportunity …rms have for nominal price adjustments.
I address this critique by developing a two-country version of the dynamic general equilibrium model with state-dependent pricing (SDP) from Dotsey, King, and Wolman (1999) in which …rms price-discriminate across markets by setting price in local currency. 1 In the model, …rms pay a single menu cost to have the opportunity to change their domestic and export prices. The SDP pricing structure implies that the degree of price rigidity depends on the state of the economy: Over the business cycle, this pricing structure generates discrete and occasional price adjustments by …rms in light of variations in demand and cost conditions. Those changes in economic environment a¤ect not only the intensive margin-the level of price adjustment undertaken by price-adjusting …rms-but also the extensive margin-the fraction of …rms actively engaged in price adjustment. I …nd that a domestic monetary expansion generates larger spillover e¤ects to foreign prices and foreign economic activity under the SDP model, than a similar model with time-dependent pricing (TDP) because of the interplay between the intensive and extensive margins.
In local-currency pricing models, a domestic monetary expansion a¤ects …rms' pro…ts on exported goods via two channels: a depreciation of the dollar, and an increase in marginal cost generated by higher domestic demand. On one hand, the dollar depreciation increases pro…ts as …rms get more dollar for every unit sold in the foreign market. On the other, the increase in marginal cost shrinks pro…ts. In the TDP model, these two e¤ects roughly balance out over the expected horizon of price rigidities. Therefore, …rms barely adjust export prices following a domestic 1 In my previous work (Landry 2009) , I look at the implications of monetary policy shocks in a two-country model with state-dependent pricing in which the law-of-one price holds. monetary expansion. In the SDP model, …rms have the ability to change their prices in light of demand and cost conditions. On impact, the …rst e¤ect dominates and …rms decide to lower their export prices to attract foreign demand. However, the second e¤ect takes over after a few quarters and …rms start raising export prices. Over the business cycle, these export price movements generate ‡uctuations in foreign expenditure without any actions in foreign monetary policy. This result contradicts the current wisdom and has important implications for the design of international monetary policy in a local-currency pricing environment. I take the model to the data by choosing parameter values to replicate the trade relationship between the U.S. and Canada. I introduce two features to the model to better capture the business-cycle moments observed in the data. First, I add variable demand elasticity, following the work of Kimball (1995) , to generate inertia in prices and adjustment fractions. Second, I introduce investment with variable capital utilization, following the work of Baxter and Farr (2005) 
The Model
The world economy consists of two countries. Each country is populated by a representative household, a continuum of monopolistic …rms, and a monetary authority.
Households purchase goods produced in both countries for consumption and investment, and supply labor and capital on a competitive basis. Firms rent labor and capital from the domestic market to produce goods. They can price-discriminate across countries and set prices in local currency. The distinctive feature of the model is that in each period, …rms can change their prices by paying a menu cost.
If a …rm decides to pay the menu cost, it has the opportunity to change its domestic and export prices. Once prices are set, …rms must satisfy demand.
In what follows, each variable is represented by a country-i.e. i; j = 1; 2 for Country 1 (U.S.) and Country 2 (Canada)-and time subscripts. When three subscripts are present, the …rst denotes the country of production, the second denotes the country of consumption or investment, and the third denotes time.
Households
Households are identical across countries except for the local bias introduced in consumption and investment. They make consumption c i;t and labor supply n i;t decisions to maximize expected lifetime utility:
The momentary utility function is separable in consumption and leisure. The parameter represents the discount factor, represents the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and represents the elasticity of labor supply.
The households'optimal consumption allocations are de…ned as a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) composite of domestic and imported consumption, such In these equations, the parameters i for i = 1; 2 represent the steady-state shares of imports into consumption, and represents the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods. The goal of the household is to minimize expenditure such that equation (2) holds. The solution to the minimization problem yields the following optimal consumption quantities: 
where P C i;t for i = 1; 2 represents the aggregate consumption prices, and P P i;j;t for i = 1; 2 represents the aggregate producer prices.
Households also choose an optimal amount of capital through investment i i;t .
Investment decisions are made following the capital accumulation equations:
where k i;t denotes the capital stocks, the depreciation function with 0 > 0 and 00 < 0, u i;t the utilization rates of capital, and the capital adjustment cost with 0 > 0 and 00 < 0. The households'optimal investment allocations are identical to the consumption allocations (2).
Given these optimal choices, aggregate consumption and investment prices are a weighted sum of domestic and imported goods prices: 
The problem for households is then to choose consumption, investment, labor, and portfolio holdings to maximize lifetime utility (1) subject to a sequence of intertemporal budget constraints (6) and allocation of time. The maximization problem implies that the ratios of marginal utilities of consumption i;t are equalized across countries, or q t = 2;t = 1;t . The real exchange rate is de…ned as q t = S t P C 2;t =P C 1;t , where S t is the dollar price of one unit of foreign currency, and re ‡ects initial wealth di¤erences.
Finally, the level of nominal aggregate demand is governed by a cash-in-advance constraint M i;t = P c i;t c i;t + P i i;t i i;t for i = 1; 2, along with money supply rules.
Firms
A continuum of monopolistically competitive …rms is located on the unit interval and indexed by z in each country. At any date t, a …rm is identi…ed by its current prices and its current menu cost of price adjustment i;t (z) 2 0; B . The menu cost is denominated in labor hours and drawn from a time-invariant distribution G( i;t )
common across all …rms in country i. Since the indices z are uncorrelated over time, and there are no other state variables attached to individual …rms, price-adjusting …rms in the same country …nd it optimal to charge a common price in each market.
I restrict the analysis to positive steady-state in ‡ation rates so that the bene…t of price adjustment becomes in…nitely large as the number of periods for which the price has been …xed grows. Given that the support of the distribution G( i;t ) is …nite, there is a …nite fraction of vintages in each country F i , a vintage being a measure of …rms with common domestic and export prices. Consider the following expenditure-minimization problem for each country:
where
In these equations, d i;j;t represents the demand for goods produced in country i and purchased in country j. Each …rm produces a di¤erentiated product such that P i;j;t (z) identi…es the price charged by an individual …rm with relative demand d i;j;t (z)=d i;j;t . The demand aggregator is such that an aggregate producer price index P P i;j;;t holds in each market. The demand aggregator is an increasing and concave function re ‡ecting diminishing demand elasticity and is de…ned over the parameters ' and %. The parameter ' determines the curvature of the demand function, while % determines the elasticity of demand at average product prices. A nice property of this speci…cation is that the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator is a special case represented by ' = 0.
The demand aggregator de…nes …rms'relative demand as a function of individual and aggregate prices, and of the curvature parameters of the demand function
Finally, the aggregate producer prices follow a weighted sum of prices over individual …rm demand ratios
Production
Supply is demand driven, and production by an individual …rm is the sum of demand in the domestic and export markets:
Equation (12) illustrates that production by an individual …rm depends on its price relative to other domestic …rms (PPI) and on the market's demand. Market demand is determined by the sum of consumption and investment demand such that d i;j;t = c i;j;t + i i;j;t for i; j = 1; 2.
Labor used for price adjustment is denoted n a i;t (z), and labor used for production is denoted n y i;t (z). Total labor employed by a …rm is thus n a i;t (z) + n y i;t (z) = n i;t (z). Production by an individual …rm is
where & represents the labor share in production.
Pricing Policy
In both SDP and TDP frameworks, the …rms'optimal decision can be represented using a dynamic programming approach: Given the level of demand, the current menu cost of price adjustment, the current real price, the prevailing real capital service, and the real wage, individual …rms decide whether or not to adjust their prices with respect to a state vector s t . Accordingly, each …rm z that has changed its price f periods ago has a real value function of the form 
with the value if the individual …rm does v i;0;t or does not v i;f;t adjust, and the optimal prices chosen by adjusting …rms b p C i;i;f;t = P i;i;f;t =P C i;t , and b p C i;j;f;t = S t P i;j;f;t =P C i;t for i = 1 and j = 2 and b p C i;j;f;t = P i;j;t =S t P C i;t for i = 2 and j = 1. Both the optimal and current real prices are relative to domestic CPI, which are prices used in …rms'
decisionmaking. i;t;t+1 = i;t+1 = i;t denotes the ratio of future to current marginal utility and is the appropriate discount factor for future real pro…ts. Finally, real pro…ts is de…ned as p C i;i;t ; p C i;j;t js t = p C i;i;f;t i;t y i;i;t + p C i;j;f;t i;t y i;j;t where i;t represents marginal cost. Therefore, …rms' pro…ts are a¤ected by the prices received for units sold domestically and abroad and by marginal cost. Equation (14) shows that the …rm must weigh the current and future bene…ts of adjusting its prices against the status quo. Price-adjusting …rms set prices optimally and choose cost-minimizing levels of input. Firms that decide not to adjust prices satisfy demand while choosing inputs to minimize costs. In this model, the fraction of …rms in country i that choose to adjust is i;j;t . These fractions are determined by the menu cost of marginal …rms being just equal to the value gained such that 2
Finally, the dynamic program (14) implies that the optimal price satis…es a …rst-order equation balancing pricing e¤ects on current and expected future pro…ts. As part of an optimal plan, price-adjusting …rms choose prices that satisfy
Iterating these …rst-order equations (16) forward, …rms'nominal optimal prices b P i;j;t can be expressed as an explicit function of current and expected future variables 
where i;f;t;t+f represents the probability of nonadjustment from t to t + j and i;j;f;t+f denotes the elasticity of demand for the individual …rm. The optimal prices charged by price-adjusting …rms have a …xed markup over real marginal cost 2 These are continuous functions on the unit interval 0 i;f;t 1 such that the real labor cost of a marginal …rm is ( i;f;t ) if the fraction of …rms i;f;t are adjusting prices. Thus, (15) describes the endogenous fractions of price-adjusting …rms in each country.
if the demand elasticity and the aggregate prices are expected to be constant over time. These optimal pricing rules derived from the maximization problem (18) 
General Equilibrium
The aggregate state of the economy at time t is a vector s t = (M 1;t ; M 2;t ; 1;t ; 2;t ),
where M i;t represents the exogenous state variables and i;t represents the period t distribution of producer prices in country i. Given the aggregate state, a general equilibrium for the economy is a collection of functions satisfying a set of equilibrium conditions: a collection of allocations for consumers c 1 ; i 1 ; n 1 ; b 1 and c 2 ; i 2 ; n 2 ; b 2 ; a collection of allocations and prices for …rms y 1 (z); x 1 (z); n 1 (z); P 1;1 (z); P 1;2 (z) and y 2 (z); x 2 (z); n 2 (z); P 22 (z); P 21 (z); and a collection of prices P P 1;1 ; P P 2;1 ; P C 1 ; Q 1 ; W 1 ; D 1 and P P 2;2 ; P P 1;2 ; P C 2 ; Q 2 ; W 2 ; D 2 such that (i) households maximize their utilities, (ii) …rms maximize their values, and (iii) aggregate consistency conditions hold. These aggregate consistency conditions include market-clearing conditions in the goods and labor markets, and in the time-varying distributions of …rms in each country. Table 1 Given that the household e¢ ciency condition is wt = c t n , and that consumption and labor are approximately equal to output, the elasticity of marginal cost is approximately equal to + .
Parameterization
somewhere between the response assumed by Kimball (1995) and Bergin and Feenstra (2001) . The remaining parameters involve the adjustment-cost distributions which, along with the demand functions, determine the timing and distribution of prices. Table 2 presents the steady-state adjustment hazards and vintage fractions of adjusting …rms for each country. The adjustment-cost structure is consistent with microeconomic data on price adjustment that suggest steady-state adjustment hazards are quadratic in log relative price deviations (Caballero and Engle 1993). 5 The parameter values imply an average age of prices of 1:75 quarters and an ex- Money supply growth is exogenous and follows an autoregressive process of the form
where i represents the coe¢ cients of autocorrelation and " i;t are independently and identically distributed zero-mean disturbances. The value of 1 is 0:53 for the U.S. and the value of 2 is 0:42 for Canada. These values come from running a regression on the logarithm of (18) using M1 quarterly data for the U.S. and Canada. The standard deviation of the shocks are 1:63 percent in the U.S. and 2:94 percent in Canada. The cross-correlations of these shocks are chosen to match two moments observed in the data: the correlation between U.S. and Canadian output, and the correlation between U.S. output and the U.S. trade balance. I use the simulated method of moments to …nd the cross-correlations of these shocks. Finally, I set the steady-state money growth rate to 4 percent, which corresponds to the average in ‡ation rates observed in these countries over the sample period.
Findings
In this section, I …rst discuss the SDP model's responses to the 1 percent increase in the U.S. money stock and contrast these responses with those from a TDP model for which the fractions of price-adjusting …rms are held …xed at steady-state values.
In contrast to the ‡at adjustment hazards of Calvo (1983) , the TDP adjustment hazards are similar to Levin (1991) , in which the adjustment probabilities are conditional on the amount of time elapsed since a …rm's last price adjustment. To get a better understanding of the mechanism through which money a¤ects international economic activity, I start by exploring the reactions of individual …rms to a U.S.
monetary expansion in subsection 4.1. In this subsection, I also discuss the amount of exchange rate pass-through to optimal export prices charged by price-adjusting …rms, and to aggregate export prices. In subsection 4. 
Firms'Reactions to a U.S. Monetary Expansion
In this subsection, I look at the …rms'reactions to a U.S. monetary expansion. The U.S. monetary expansion is transmitted to …rms'pro…ts through a depreciation of the U.S. dollar and a rise in marginal costs generated by an increase in domestic demand. Figure 1 displays the …rms'reactions to a U.S. monetary expansion. The top row displays the fractions of price-adjusting …rms. The middle rows display the optimal prices chosen by price-adjusting …rms for their domestic and export markets. The bottom rows display the corresponding aggregate prices. In order to understand the international transmission mechanism, one needs to understand the pass-through from exchange rate movements to export prices. Table 2 displays the exchange rate pass-through to both, optimal export prices and aggregate export prices. I de…ne the exchange rate pass-through as the percentage change in export prices relative to a change in currency value.
In the TDP model, …rms adjust prices on the intensive margin. The monetary expansion causes an increase in U.S. demand and induces U.S. price-adjusting …rms to increase both domestic and export prices. I start by looking at the U.S. …rms' reactions. The U.S. optimal domestic price jumps on impact and slowly converges to its new long-run value, while the optimal export price increases slightly. On one hand, a depreciation of the U.S. dollar should induce U.S. …rms to reduce prices in the Canadian market. On the other, the e¤ect of an expected increase in marginal cost induces U.S. …rms to increase prices in the Canadian market. These two e¤ects roughly balance out in a TDP environment over the expected horizon of price rigidity. In the current framework, the latter e¤ect dominates and the optimal export price increases little. This generates a negative exchange rate pass-through, both in optimal and aggregate export prices. Now, let's turn to the behavior of the Canadian …rms. The optimal domestic price stays near steady-state value as domestic demand remains nearly constant.
However, Canadian …rms follow their U.S. counterparts in setting U.S. prices: The optimal export price jumps on impact and slowly converges to its new long-run value. On impact, this generates a change in optimal export prices that is 70 percent higher than the change in currency value. This aggressive price response diminishes over time to reach 8 percent after one year. On aggregate, the amount of exchange rate pass-through is 35 percent on impact and 63 percent after one year.
Firms react di¤erently in the SDP model because they adjust prices on the intensive and extensive margins. For the U.S. domestic market, SDP means that U.S.
…rms can make small price adjustments now knowing they can choose to increase them later when it is more valuable to do so. Therefore, the optimal domestic price responds little because …rms do not want to lose pro…t by raising prices too aggressively. For the U.S. export market, SDP means that U.S. …rms can make bigger pro…ts now by lowering the optimal export price. In contrast to the TDP model, the optimal export price decreases on impact. In fact, the optimal export price drops 15 percent more than the U.S. dollar. On aggregate, this implies an amount of exchange rate pass-through of 28 percent. Over time, the increase in marginal cost takes over and induces …rms to adjust prices upward. This becomes obvious four to six quarters after the monetary expansion as the U.S. adjusting fraction and optimal prices deviate further from their long-run values. Ultimately, the collective action of price-adjusting …rms feeds into the aggregate price level, and the piling up of prices and actions leads to higher optimal prices.
In turn, movements in U.S. export prices in ‡uence Canadian …rms'reactions. On impact, the optimal domestic price stays near steady-state value as domestic demand remains nearly constant, while Canadian …rms follow their U.S. counterparts in setting U.S. prices. This generates a change in optimal export prices that is 82 percent higher than the change in currency value. As in the TDP model, this aggressive price response diminishes over time to reach 13 percent after one year.
After a few quarters, higher export demand raises marginal cost and induces …rms to adjust prices upward. This becomes obvious eight to ten quarters after the monetary expansion as the Canadian adjusting fraction and optimal prices deviate further from their long-run values.
Aggregate Implications to a U.S. Monetary Expansion
Price movements induced by the domestic monetary expansion a¤ect the aggregate response of the TDP and SDP models in di¤erent ways. 
Business Cycles Analysis
In this subsection, I look at the business cycle implications of the model. First, I discuss the main features of U.S. and Canadian economic ‡uctuations as well as trade between the two countries. Second, I take the model to the data by assuming that both countries'money stocks evolve over the business cycle. Finally, I examine the sensitivity of my …ndings by varying assumptions about the benchmark features.
The Data
The U.S. data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, with the exception of the monetary aggregate and the quarterly exchange rates, which are from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The Canadian data are from Statistics Canada, with the exception of the monetary aggregate, which is from the Bank of Canada. Appendix A o¤ers a more detailed description of the data. Table 4 presents the business cycle statistics for output, consumption, investment, trade balances, and CPI in ‡ation rates for the U.S. and Canada. The trade balances include only trade between the two countries and are relative to output. Table 5 presents the business cycle statistics for real and nominal exchange rates, as well as for the CPI price ratio. The moments were calculated using a band-pass business-cycle …lter that admits frequency components between 6 and 32 quarters.
Although the data are from 1974Q1 to 2008Q4, the e¤ective data used in the bandpass statistics are from 1977Q1 to 2005Q4 (see Baxter and King 1999) . All the variables were de ‡ated using the implicit price de ‡ators for gross domestic product.
Output, consumption, and investment are procyclical, with consumption being less volatile than output and investment being more volatile than output. The U.S. trade balance is countercyclical, but the Canadian trade balance is procyclical.
Both have a volatility much lower than output. CPI in ‡ation rates are procyclical and have a volatility much lower than output. The correlations between U.S. and
Canadian output, consumption, investment, and CPI in ‡ation rates are all positive.
As for international prices, real and nominal exchange rates are highly correlated and highly volatile relative to output. The CPI price ratio is positively correlated with the real exchange rate and about half as volatile as output. Tables 4 and 5 present the …ltered moments generated by the SDP and TDP models.
The Benchmark Models
I assume that both countries'money stocks evolve over the business cycle and that these shocks are the only exogenous shocks in the model. 6 For each model, the crosscorrelations of the monetary shocks are set to reproduce the correlation between U.S.
and Canadian output and the correlation between U.S. output and the U.S. trade balance observed in the data.
The SDP model performs well in terms of predictions for relative volatility, autocorrelation, and correlation with output. In the TDP model, the correlation between Canadian output and the trade balance has the wrong sign, and the correlation between Canadian output and the CPI in ‡ation rate is too strong. Finally, both models capture the positive cross-country correlations of output, consumption, investment, and CPI in ‡ation rates-although the consumption and investment cross-country correlations are higher than the output cross-country correlation in the SDP model.
As for international prices, the relative volatilities of the real and nominal exchange rates with respect to output are too small in both models. The SDP model also predicts a negative correlation between the real and nominal exchange rate, which is contrary to the data. However, the SDP model does a good job matching the dynamics of the CPI price ratio-it does particularly well matching the volatility of this ratio relative to U.S. output and its correlation relative to the real exchange rate. The variants with Dixit-Stiglitz demands and without variable capital utilization are able to generate a lower cross-country consumption correlation but perform worst in many other dimensions, notably in terms of CPI in ‡ation rates and trade balance dynamics. As for international prices, the correlation between the real exchange rate and the price ratio has the wrong sign in the variant with Dixit-Stiglitz demands.
Variations on the Benchmark SDP Model
Finally, the performance of the variant with a single uncontingent nominal bond is roughly similar to the SDP model benchmark with complete …nancial markets.
Conclusion
This paper developed a two-country model with SDP in which …rms price-discriminate across countries by setting prices in the local currency. I show that a domestic monetary expansion has greater spillover e¤ects to foreign prices and foreign economic activity than an otherwise identical model with TDP. The spillover e¤ects arise because of the interplay between the intensive and extensive margins. This result suggests that the monetary policy implications associated with local-currency pricing are probably speci…c to the TDP speci…cations. Next, I look at the implications of the business-cycle moments generated by the models and compared them with moments generated by the data. I …nd that the SDP model's predictions match the business-cycle moments better than the predictions of the TDP model.
Unfortunately, the SDP model has two caveats relative to other TDP models in the literature. First, by breaking the ability of local-currency pricing to insulate the foreign economy from a domestic monetary shock, the SDP benchmark model loses the ability to generate low cross-country consumption and investment correlations.
Second, the SDP model is unable to replicate the dynamics between the real and nominal exchange rates observed in the data. Adding frictions to …x these two caveats is something to investigate in future research.
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